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REVISITING THE REVISIONIST 
HISTORY OF STANDARD OIL 
CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As the contributions to this symposium prove, the Standard Oil case 
continues to inform many aspects of current antitrust policy. Part of 
Standard Oil‘s significance, however, has been lost over time. The 
Supreme Court condemned a range of conduct by Standard Oil as 
anticompetitive, including predatory pricing. Predatory pricing occurs 
when a firm prices its product below cost in order to drive its competitors 
from the market. Once enough rivals have exited the market, the predator 
raises price and earns a stream of monopoly profits. 
In the decades following the opinion, the conventional wisdom held 
that Standard Oil had engaged in predatory pricing. The Standard Oil 
opinion stood for the proposition that using predatory pricing to acquire or 
maintain a monopoly violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The opinion 
did not define the contours of predatory pricing, neither explicitly saying 
that a predatory price is a price below cost nor specifying what measure of 
cost courts should use. Nevertheless, the opinion laid the groundwork for 
future federal courts to address these questions and to provide more 
structure to the predatory pricing cause of action. 
This symposium piece proceeds as follows. Part II briefly reviews 
Standard‘s pricing strategy, the government‘s case against Standard, and 
the Supreme Court‘s holding that monopolization through predatory 
pricing violates the Sherman Act. Part III presents the revisionist history of 
Standard Oil generated by John McGee‘s 1958 article, which argued that 
Standard did not engage in predatory pricing. Part III then explores how 
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McGee‘s work has affected antitrust jurisprudence. Part IV challenges 
McGee‘s interpretation of the trial record in Standard Oil. Finally, Part V 
explains that McGee‘s work is theoretical, not empirical, and has had 
undue influence. Part VI concludes. 
II.  PREDATORY PRICING IN THE STANDARD OIL CASE 
In her exposé of Standard Oil, journalist Ida Tarbell reported that, 
depending on the presence or absence of competitors in a particular market, 
Standard sold its product at a loss or at a significant profit.1 While basic 
economic theory explains that a firm will charge more in a market where it 
enjoys market power than in a competitive market, Tarbell showed that 
Standard did not merely charge the competitive price in the latter. Rather, it 
charged a price below cost in order to drive competitors from the market. 
The particular form of predatory pricing that Standard employed relied on 
the fact that Standard operated in a number of local markets. In those 
markets where Standard had no competitors, the company acted like a 
monopolist, charging a monopoly price. In those markets where rivals 
constrained Standard‘s monopolistic ambitions, Standard reduced its price 
dramatically in a bid to drive the rivals from the market. 
Tarbell provided evidence from state investigations, showing 
numerous instances from around the country of Standard engaging in 
predatory pricing.2 Standard also studied its competitors to see which 
dealers had placed orders with them, and it approached those dealers, 
demanding that they countermand their orders from Standard‘s competitors 
or else Standard would reduce ―the price of oil down to such a price that 
they cannot afford to handle the goods.‖3 When one Pennsylvania-based 
independent refinery began shipping ―Sunlight‖-brand oil into South Bend, 
Washington, Standard‘s Portland-based agents threatened South Bend 
dealers: ―We do not purpose to allow another carload to come into that 
territory unless it comes and is put on the market at one-half its actual 
cost.‖4 After Standard Oil used predatory pricing to drive a competitor 
from a regional market, Tarbell explained, ―the price of oil has always gone 
back with a jerk to the point where it was when the cutting began, and not 
 
 1. 2 IDA M. TARBELL, THE HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY 221 (1904). 
 2. Id. at 42–62. 
 3. Id. at 43 (quoting testimony of Peter Shull, of Independent Oil Company of Mansfield, Ohio, 
before the Ohio Investigative Committee). 
 4. Id. at 50. See also id. at 47 ( ―Waters-Pierce Oil Company [Standard‘s Texas agents] would 
cut below cost on‖ oil (quoting letter from dealer)). 
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infrequently it has gone higher—the public pays.‖5 
Tarbell‘s book proved a sensation. Many Americans had already 
resented Rockefeller‘s control over petroleum.6 Tarbell provided more 
structure and substance to these criticisms by demonstrating the pattern of 
Standard‘s abuses in a comprehensive and accessible manner. Daniel 
Yergin has opined that Tarbell‘s tome was ―[a]rguably . . . the single most 
influential book on business ever published in the United States.‖7 In many 
ways, Tarbell‘s work informed the government‘s antitrust case against 
Standard Oil. 
In challenging Standard Oil‘s conduct as a violation of the Sherman 
Act, the government argued that Standard Oil engaged in predatory pricing 
in over one hundred local markets.8 In its brief before the Supreme Court, 
the government explained that the predator  
puts the price of the commodity handled so low, at the point where his 
victim is in business, as to make it impossible to meet such price except 
at a loss, and, to offset what loss he suffers at that point, he raises prices 
at one or more other points.9 
The Supreme Court sided with the government and ordered the 
company dissolved. In finding that Standard Oil had violated the Sherman 
Act, the Court held that the firm had engaged in illegal predatory pricing, 
which it described as ―local price cutting at the points where necessary to 
suppress competition.‖10 The dissolution of Standard Oil did not turn solely 
on the finding of predatory pricing. The Supreme Court‘s ruling rested on a 
litany of anticompetitive conduct. Nevertheless, the Standard Oil opinion 
held that using predatory pricing to monopolize a market violates the 
Sherman Act. 
Subsequent courts treated Standard Oil as a predatory pricing case.11 
 
 5. Id. at 59. See also id. (―Several of the letters already quoted in this chapter show the 
immediate recoil of the market to higher prices with the removal of competition.‖). 
 6. See Barak Orbach & Grace Campbell Rebling, The Antitrust Curse of Bigness, 85 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 605, 609–23 (2012) (describing the rise of Standard Oil). 
 7. DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE 105 (1991). 
 8. See Reply Brief for the United States, Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) 
(No. 398), 1911 WL 19167, at *44. 
 9. Id. at *46 (quoting State v. Cent. Lumber Co., 123 N.W. 504, 509 (S.D. 1909)). 
 10. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 43 (1911). In the vernacular of the time, ―local 
price cutting‖ meant pricing below cost.  See William S. Stevens, Unfair Competition, 29 POL. SCI. Q.  
282, 284 (1914) (―Local price-cutting has been a frequent and familiar weapon of the trusts. As here 
used the term means that an organization cuts the prices of its products to a point below the cost of 
production in one or more of the localities where competition exists.‖). 
 11. For other significant economic issues in the Standard Oil case, see Daniel A. Crane, Were 
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For example, lower courts cited Standard Oil for the proposition that in the 
quest for monopoly power ―price cutting became perhaps the most 
effective weapon of the larger corporation. These cases are controlled by 
the second section of the Sherman Anti-Trust law.‖12 Price cutting in this 
context referred to what today would be characterized as price predation.13 
Following the Supreme Court‘s opinion in Standard Oil, Congress, 
too, continued to show concern about firms pursuing Standard‘s strategy of 
charging a high price in a monopolized market in order to subsidize 
predation in a competitive market. In 1914, Congress enacted Section 2 of 
the Clayton Act largely in response to the predatory pricing practices of 
Standard Oil.14 Nearly two decades later, Congress enacted Section 3 of the 
Robinson-Patman Act, which amended Section 2 of the Clayton Act. The 
legislative intent, however, remained the same: prohibit the predatory 
pricing practices observed in the Standard Oil case.15 In explaining the 
history of Section 3, the Court has cited Standard Oil for the fact ―[t]hat 
sales below cost without a justifying business reason may come within the 
proscriptions of the Sherman Act has long been established.‖16 
In short, Standard Oil was a predatory pricing case. Courts, Congress, 
and commentators17 all saw it as such. 
 
Standard Oil’s Rebates and Drawbacks Cost Justified?, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 559 (2012); Benjamin 
Klein, The “Hub-and-Spoke” Conspiracy that Created the Standard Oil Monopoly, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 
459 (2012); George L. Priest, Rethinking the Economic Basis of the Standard Oil Refining Monopoly: 
Dominance Against Competing Cartels, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 499 (2012); William H. Page, Standard Oil 
and U.S. Steel: Predation and Collusion in the Law of Monopolization and Mergers, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 
657 (2012). 
 12. U.S. v. A. Schrader‘s Son, 264 F. 175, 181 (D. Ohio 1919), rev’d, 252 U.S. 85 (1920). See 
also Malcolm v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 845, 853 n.16 (5th Cir. 1981) (―Predatory pricing violates 
§ 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, when there is an attempt to monopolize‖ (citing Standard Oil, 
221 U.S. at 43)). 
 13. See Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687, 689 (2d Cir. 1938); Nat‘l Ass‘n of 
Regulatory Util. Comm‘rs v. FCC., 525 F.2d 630, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (citing Standard Oil, 221 U.S. 
at 43 for proposition that ―[c]utting prices below marginal cost in order to discourage competition is the 
most blatant form of predatory behavior and, at least where the price cutter holds significant market 
power, is subject to attack under Sherman Act § 2‖); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F.Supp. 
384, 400 (D.C. Del. 1978) (citing Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 43 for proposition that ―predatory pricing‖ 
is ―an antitrust violation generally manifested by selling below one‘s own cost for the purpose of 
effectuating long term domination of the market‖). 
 14. McGahee v. N. Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1498 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting H.R. Rep. 
No. 2287, at 8 (1914)). 
 15. United States v. Nat‘l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 33–34 (1963). 
 16. Id. at 33 (citing Standard Oil, 221 U.S. 1). 
 17. See Richard C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store Movement, Localist Ideology, and the 
Remnants of the Progressive Constitution, 1920–1940, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1011, 1063 (2005). 
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 III.  THE CHICAGO SCHOOL REWRITES ANTITRUST HISTORY 
Standard Oil stood as a predatory pricing case for over forty years, 
until the emergence of the Chicago School of Law and Economics 
challenged the rationality of the practice. This, in turn, led John McGee to 
question the factual accuracy of the Standard Oil opinion. McGee revisited 
the trial record and proclaimed, 
I can not find a single instance in which Standard used predatory 
price cutting to force a rival refiner to sell out, to reduce asset 
values for purchase, or to drive a competitor out of business. I do 
not believe that Standard even tried to do it; if it tried, it did not 
work.18  
McGee argued that predatory pricing was irrational, and he posited an 
alternative explanation: Standard acquired its competitors during an era of 
weak merger law.19 
McGee‘s indictment of the Supreme Court‘s predatory pricing holding 
in Standard Oil gained serious traction. Almost thirty years after the 
publication of McGee‘s original article, the Supreme Court considered the 
issue of predatory pricing in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp.20 The Court held that the defendants accused of participating 
in a predatory pricing conspiracy were entitled to summary judgment 
because predatory pricing—by a single dominant firm, let alone pursuant to 
a conspiracy—is inherently irrational. The Matsushita Court cited McGee, 
among others, for the proposition that ―there is a consensus among 
commentators that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even 
more rarely successful.‖21 
In the aftermath of Matsushita, antitrust plaintiffs generally lost 
predatory pricing claims during the pre-trial motions phase of litigation, as 
lower courts invoked the Matsushita Court‘s assertion that predatory 
pricing does not occur because it is irrational.22 The influence of McGee‘s 
 
 18. John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137, 
157 (1958). 
 19. Id.  
 20. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 21. Id. at 589 (citations omitted). 
 22. See, e.g., United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1114 (10th Cir. 2003); WorldCom, 
Inc. v. FCC., 238 F.3d 449, 463 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Stearns Airport Equip. Co., Inc. v. FMC Corp., 170 
F.3d 518, 527–28 (5th Cir. 1999); Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1196 (3d Cir. 
1995); Stitt Spark Plug Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 840 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir. 1988); Mathias 
v. Daily News, L.P., 152 F. Supp. 2d 465, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Servicetrends, Inc. v. Siemens Med. 
Sys., Inc., 870 F.Supp. 1042, 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1994); Nat‘l Benefit Adm‘rs, Inc. v. Blue Cross, [1989-2] 
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article is seen in the Third Circuit‘s Advo, Inc. v. Philadelphia Newspapers, 
Inc. opinion rejecting a predatory pricing claim: 
While it once was believed widely that turn-of-the-century ―robber 
barons‖ commonly practiced predatory pricing to eliminate competitors, 
research over the last few decades has exposed this belief as a myth. For 
instance, a seminal article demonstrated that John D. Rockefeller 
invariably used mergers, and not predatory pricing, to lessen competition 
in the oil industry.23 
The Advo opinion noted that the Matsushita Court ―has cited 
approvingly the empirical work of McGee and others.‖24 
It is surprising that the Matsushita Court and later courts used 
Standard Oil—through McGee—to assert that predatory pricing is not tried 
and does not succeed given that the Supreme Court‘s own precedent in the 
Standard Oil case showed the opposite. The Supreme Court in Matsushita 
adopted the revisionist history of Standard Oil instead of the Supreme 
Court‘s own opinion in the case. In essence, the Supreme Court in 
Matsushita followed McGee and not Standard Oil.25 The Supreme Court 
never explicitly repudiated its predatory pricing holding from Standard Oil, 
but such repudiation is the thrust of the Matsushita opinion and its 
invocation of McGee.26 
 
TRADE CAS. (CCH) P 68831, 62376 (M.D. Ala. 1989). For strategic private and public antitrust 
litigation, see D. Daniel Sokol, The Strategic Use of Public and Private Litigation in Antitrust as 
Business Strategy, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 689 (2012). 
 23. Advo, 51 F.3d at 1196 (citing McGee, supra note 18, at 168–69). 
 24. Id. at 1196 n.5 (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588–90). See also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is 
Post-Chicago Economics Ready for the Courtroom? A Response to Professor Brennan, 69 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1103, 1117 (2001) (―McGee's analysis was instrumental in persuading the Supreme Court to 
issue two opinions in the past fifteen years in which it has expressed an extremely skeptical attitude 
toward predatory pricing complaints.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
 25. James A. Dalton & Louis Esposito, Predatory Price Cutting and Standard Oil: A Re-
Examination of the Trial Record, 22 RES. L. & ECON. 155, 156 (2007) (―This single publication appears 
to serve as a foundation of the U.S. Supreme Court's position on the issue of predatory pricing, as well 
as the basis for the assertion by many economists that predatory pricing is irrational and rarely 
occurs.‖).  
 26. Before Matsushita, and after McGee, many courts continued to cite the Standard Oil case for 
the proposition that predatory pricing by a monopolist can violate Section 2. See, e.g., Janich Bros. v. 
American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 855 (9th Cir. 1977) (―‗[P]redatory pricing‘ may be a means of 
obtaining or maintaining a monopoly position in violation of section 2 of the Sherman 
Act . . . .‖ (citing United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 160, 182 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v. 
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 43 (1911))); J.H. Westerbeke Corp. v. Onan Corp., 580 F. Supp. 1173, 1188 
(D.C. Mass. 1984) (―Conduct unnecessary for the competitive process, by comparison, includes 
merging to monopoly, long term exclusive supply contracts, exploitation of purchasing 
leverage, predatory pricing, etc.‖ (citing Standard Oil, 221 U.S. 1)). That is less common after 
Matsushita, though some state courts continue to cite Standard Oil‘s conduct as an example of 
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In many ways, McGee‘s account of Standard‘s pricing is now 
considered the conventional wisdom. Many economists accept the Chicago 
School‘s premise that predatory pricing does not happen. The source of this 
perspective is McGee‘s 1958 article: 
Despite the widespread belief that Rockefeller maintained his position by 
selling oil below cost in order to drive competitors out of business, a 
careful study of the record of the antitrust case that led to the breaking up 
of Standard Oil found no evidence that he had ever done so. The story 
appears to be the historian‘s equivalent of an urban myth.27 
Commentators routinely accept without question McGee‘s assertion that 
Standard Oil did not engage in price predation.28  
 IV.  A CASE STUDY IN OVERCLAIMING 
John McGee was wildly successful in spinning an alternative narrative 
of Standard Oil‘s pricing strategy. McGee‘s article is an important case 
study that helped establish the Chicago School of Law and Economics. 
Unfortunately, it is also a case study in overclaiming. The article stands for 
three related propositions. First, Standard Oil did not engage in predatory 
pricing. Second, firms do not attempt predatory pricing. Third, predatory 
pricing is inherently unprofitable. None of these conclusions flows from 
McGee‘s investigation into the trial record of the Standard Oil case. 
A.  CLAIM: STANDARD OIL DID NOT PRICE BELOW COST 
From his review of the trial record, McGee concluded that Standard 
did not engage in predatory pricing. His conclusion on this point has been 
accepted as historical fact in many circles.29 Scholars continue to cite 
McGee for the proposition Standard ―never actually used‖ predatory 
pricing.30 
This claim, however, is problematic. McGee examined the trial record 
 
predatory pricing. See, e.g., Caller-Times Pub. Co. v. Triad Commc‘ns, Inc., 826 S.W.2d 576, 598 (Tex. 
1992). 
 27. DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW‘S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO DO WITH LAW AND WHY 
IT MATTERS 250 (2000) (citing McGee, supra note 18). 
 28. See, e.g., Donald J. Boudreaux & Burton W. Folsom, Microsoft and Standard Oil: Radical 
Lessons for Antitrust Reform, 44 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 555, 559 (1999) (asserting that ―[t]he reasons 
for [McGee‘s] conclusion are today well-known and need not be reviewed here‖). See also James A. 
Dalton & Louis Esposito, Standard Oil and Predatory Pricing: Myth Paralleling Fact, 38 REV. INDUS. 
ORG. 245, 255–57 (2011) (showing McGee‘s influence in economics textbooks and legal scholarship). 
 29. See supra text accompanying notes 25–26. 
 30. Bruce Johnsen & Moin A. Yahya, The Evolution of Sherman Act Jurisdiction: A Roadmap 
for Competitive Federalism, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 403, 407 n.20 (2004). 
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and found no evidence of predatory pricing and concluded, therefore, that 
Standard did not engage in price predation. This is logically flawed because 
McGee‘s inability to find evidence to prove the affirmative case does not 
prove the negative case. The only way to prove that Standard did not 
engage in below-cost pricing would be examine Standard‘s actual costs and 
prices and show that Standard‘s price exceeded its costs. McGee never did 
this analysis. Instead, he jumped to concrete conclusions based on 
ambiguous evidence, as the following section explains. 
1.  Hasty Conclusions 
McGee was too quick to conclude that no evidence of predatory 
pricing existed and that Standard must not have engaged in price predation. 
Three examples illustrate this point. First, the government presented 
evidence of Standard‘s local price cutting in Georgia. McGee‘s 
presentation of that case reads in its entirety: 
H.C. Boardman worked for Standard in Augusta, Georgia from 1886—
1904, and testified that during that period Standard cut prices to drive out 
competitors. Boardman said that one marketer, J. T. Thornhill, ―finally 
abandoned business‖; and that other major integrated competitors of 
Standard withdrew from the territory. These allegations were 
controverted. Even Boardman admitted that Standard cut prices only ―as 
[a] last resort.‖31 
This constitutes McGee‘s complete discussion of the incident. Maybe 
Standard engaged in predatory pricing in Augusta, and maybe it did not. 
But McGee‘s recitation of the facts provides few insights and no proof. The 
fact that the allegations were controverted does not mean that Standard‘s 
version of the facts was true. Similarly, the belief that Standard only 
reduced prices ―as a last resort‖ does not disprove the predatory pricing 
hypothesis. If, ―as a last resort,‖ Standard charged a price below cost in 
order to drive competitors from the market, then Standard engaged in 
predatory pricing. Standard might have preferred other strategies, but using 
predatory pricing ―as a last resort‖ would still constitute using predatory 
pricing. 
Second, the trial record included evidence that Standard may have 
priced below cost in Paris, Illinois. McGee disagreed with that assessment: 
―Maywood Maxon, once a Standard employee, testified that in 1899 an 
unnamed independent oil dealer at Paris, Illinois was forced out of business 
 
 31. McGee, supra note 18, at 165–66 (footnotes omitted). 
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after a year of rebating and price war. Collings [a current Standard 
employee] denied the whole affair.‖32 These two sentences are McGee‘s 
entire discussion and analysis of the Paris affair. However, the fact that a 
current Standard employee denied the claims of a former Standard 
employee does not automatically disprove allegations of wrongdoing. 
McGee has proven nothing except that a government witness and a 
Standard witness disagreed with each other.33 Whether or not Standard 
engaged in predatory pricing in Paris, Illinois, McGee‘s two sentences do 
not disprove the claim that it did. 
Third, the trial record contained evidence suggesting that Standard 
engaged in predatory pricing in Youngstown. Longer than his Paris 
exposition, McGee‘s discussion of this instance reads as follows: 
C.M. Lines testified that he ran a string of bogus peddling wagons for 
Standard between 1900 and 1903. He said he thought that these concerns 
lost money. George Lane, who worked for Lines, said that in 
Youngstown Lines made a ―drive‖ on another peddler‘s business, and 
drove everybody out of business except the man he was after. On the 
other hand, Vahey, the peddler who was alleged to be the object of 
Lines‘ warfare, testified that he did a land office business when the 
Standard group attacked him. Far from going out of business, he 
apparently flourished.34 
This is the whole of McGee‘s analysis of predatory pricing in 
Youngstown. It is stunning that McGee believed his recitation of the facts 
proved that Standard did not engage in predatory pricing. The key fact is 
that the Standard employee in charge of the bogus firms testified that he 
believed Standard was pricing below cost in order to drive its competitors 
from the market. That is reasonably persuasive evidence of predatory 
pricing. McGee ignored the significance of this evidence and instead 
focuses on the detail that one competitor survived. The fact that the target 
of the alleged predation endured in no way proves that Standard did not 
charge a price below cost.35 
McGee seemed to exhibit confirmation bias.36 When facts were 
―controverted,‖ he took that as proof that his interpretation of events was 
 
 32. Id. at 166 (footnote omitted). 
 33. The trial judge was able to observe the witnesses‘ demeanor and assess their credibility. 
McGee was not. 
 34. McGee, supra note 18, at 166 (footnotes omitted). 
 35. It is also interesting that McGee supports every sentence in the Youngstown discussion with 
a citation to the record except his assertion that Vahey flourished. See id. at 166. 
 36. See Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 314–18 
(2010) (discussing confirmation bias). 
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correct.37 McGee ignored evidence that was inconsistent with his theory 
that predatory pricing does not happen.38 For example, many of the 
government witnesses were former Standard employees who testified about 
Standard‘s predatory pricing. McGee discounted their testimony without 
actually refuting it. McGee notes that Mr. Castle, who worked for Standard 
for fourteen years, ―told several other stories about Standard‘s predatory 
price cutting during the period in which he worked for them. Nevertheless, 
I think it is significant that when he left Standard in 1900 he was clearly 
unafraid: he immediately started a rival oil marketing firm.‖39 The fact that 
he eventually opened his own oil marketing firm does not disprove his 
testimony about price predation by Standard. Castle may have had reason 
to know that Standard would not price predate in the particular market that 
he was entering, or it may have been a market in which Standard allowed 
small competitors to have a modest share of the market, which the 
monopolist sometimes did.40 And as a fourteen-year-veteran of Standard, 
Castle would likely have some insights into Standard‘s market practices. 
In discussing some cases, McGee incorrectly placed great importance 
on which firm started a given price war.41 McGee strongly implied that if 
Standard did not start a particular price war, then Standard did not engage 
in predatory pricing if a competitor exited the market as a result of that 
pricing.42 For example, when examining whether Standard used predatory 
pricing to drive the Red C Oil Manufacturing Company (―Red C‖) from the 
market, McGee argued that Red C started the price war against Standard. 
From this, McGee asserted that Standard did not engage in predatory 
pricing. But that conclusion does not follow. Red C could have entered the 
 
 37. McGee, supra note 18, at 153. 
 38. In some cases, McGee discounted evidence of predatory pricing as hearsay. See, e.g., id. at 
145. While McGee may have been appropriately skeptical about hearsay, he seemed to believe that 
characterizing an account as hearsay necessarily disproves its validity. A secondhand account of 
predatory pricing may be accurate. The proper way to disprove such an account is to present the data 
that shows Standard charged a price above cost. 
 39. Id. at 148 (footnote omitted). 
 40. U.S. BUREAU OF CORPS., REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS ON THE 
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, Pt. II, Prices & Profits 443 (1907) [hereinafter U.S. BUREAU OF CORPS., 
REPORT ON PETROLEUM INDUSTRY] (―In some cases competitors substantially work in harmony with 
the Standard interests, while in other cases the Standard permits them to live, provided they keep their 
sales within what it considers reasonable limits.‖). 
 41. See, e.g., McGee, supra note 18, at 155 (―Todd said Standard started it, but acknowledged 
that Corrnplanter had started a price-cutting campaign around Boston.‖); id. at 162 (―Hisgen initiated 
price cuts against Standard.‖). 
 42. Id. at 147 (―Emery‘s sole allegation of local price cutting concerns his Philadelphia 
marketing business, which he ultimately leased to Pure Oil Co. He admits he did not know who really 
started the Philadelphia price war.‖). 
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market in response to Standard‘s monopoly prices, charging a competitive 
price. Standard could have responded by charging a price below cost in 
order both to drive Red C from the market and to send a signal to any other 
would-be rivals that entry would prove unprofitable.43 Most importantly, 
McGee never provides any evidence about either Standard‘s price or cost in 
the market. In sum, it is irrelevant who started a particular price war or 
whether Standard might have pursued predatory pricing in response to a 
rival‘s price cut. What matters is whether Standard charged a price below 
cost during the price war in order to drive its competitor from the market. 
McGee also made false extrapolations, by assuming that predatory 
pricing is mutually exclusive with other activities, such as cartelization. For 
example, Standard and Cornplanter were rivals in the Boston market. A 
fierce price war between the firms ensued, during which Standard was 
alleged to have engaged in predatory pricing. McGee noted that although 
―Mr. Todd, Cornplanter‘s Manager, testified that Standard had threatened 
Cornplanter with extinction, . . . it never materialized.‖44 Instead, the price 
war between Standard and Cornplanter in Boston was settled with a truce 
in the form of a market-sharing agreement.45 Within a few days of the 
agreement, the price of oil rose from 6.5 to 10 cents.46 McGee concluded 
from this that Standard must not have engaged in predatory pricing. McGee 
incorrectly treated cartelization and predatory pricing as mutually exclusive 
hypotheses.47 McGee was apparently unaware that dominant firms have 
historically used predatory pricing to rein in ―rogue‖ firms so that they 
behave more cooperatively.48 For example, during the early twentieth 
century, the bromine cartel used explicit threats of price wars to force other 
bromine firms to cooperate.49 Also, firms in cartels will sometimes use 
 
 43. In discussing the Red C situation, McGee credits Standard‘s testimony while discounting 
opposing testimony. Id. at 154 (discounting testimony by Standard competitor that Standard‘s bogus 
companies ―sold regardless of price, in order to secure our business‖). This can be seen as an example 
of confirmation bias. 
 44. McGee, supra note 18, at 155. 
 45. Id. at 155. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Similarly, there was evidence of predatory pricing against the Rocky Mountain Oil 
Company. Id. at 149. McGee hypothesized that Rocky Mountain had been a mechanism for two 
refiners, the Florence Oil and Refinery Company and the United Oil Company, to cheat on a cartel 
agreement with Standard. Id. at 150. McGee seems to think that his cartel hypothesis disproves the 
predatory pricing hypothesis. Id. at 151. This cartel argument fails to recognize that cartel ringleaders 
sometimes use predatory pricing as a mechanism to discipline defectors and to stabilize a cartel. 
 48. Malcolm R. Burns, Outside Intervention in Monopolistic Price Warfare: the Case of the 
“Plug War” and the Union Tobacco Company, 56 BUS. HIST. REV. 33, 41–44 (1982). 
 49. Margaret C. Levenstein, Do Price Wars Facilitate Collusion? A Study of the Bromine Cartel 
Before World War I, 33 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 107, 108 (1996) (―The internal correspondence of 
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price wars to punish defectors in order to stabilize the cartel.50 
Most importantly for our purposes, evidence indicates that Standard 
pursued this very strategy. Daniel Yergin explained that  
Rockefeller and his colleagues had often instituted a ‗good sweating‘ 
against their competitors by flooding the market and cutting the price. 
Competitors were forced to make a truce according to the rules of 
Standard Oil, or, lacking the staying power of Standard Oil, they would 
be driven out of business or taken over.51  
The U.S. Bureau of Corporations‘s (―the Bureau‘s‖) 1907 report explained 
that Standard ―undertook a price-cutting campaign to render [new 
competitors‘] business unprofitable and either to destroy them or to force 
them into an alliance on conditions favorable to the Standard‘s 
domination.‖52 In particular, Standard employed this tactic against 
Cornplanter.53 The fact that Cornplanter survived and was profitable does 
not mean that Standard Oil never engaged in price predation directed 
against its rival. In short, the Cornplanter episode potentially may illustrate 
Standard using predatory pricing as a tool to negotiate a profitable, albeit 
illegal, cartel relationship. 
None of this establishes that Standard did, in fact, employ predatory 
pricing against Cornplanter. Rather, it shows that McGee failed to prove his 
hypothesis because the mere existence of a cartel does not negate the 
possibility of predatory pricing. 
In sum, given the evidence and arguments that McGee presents, the 
most that his study could show is that there was insufficient evidence to 
support a finding of antitrust liability based on predatory pricing in 
individual instances he examined. But that is a far cry from proving that 
Standard never engaged in predatory pricing. 
 
bromine firms makes clear that these threats provided crucial motivation in the decision to cooperate.‖); 
id. at 131 (―Threats of a price war enforced collusive behavior in the bromine industry. Correspondence 
among industry participants is replete with dire warnings of imminent price wars if the reader did not 
cooperate. Correspondence among Dow Company officials makes it clear that it was only such threats 
that induced the Company‘s cooperation.‖). 
 50. Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 618 (2004). 
 51. Yergin, supra note 7, at 748. 
 52. U.S. BUREAU OF CORPS., REPORT ON PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, supra note 40, at 26 (emphasis 
added). Standard pursued this strategy in European markets as well. See id. at 26. 
 53. See Dalton & Esposito, supra note 25, at 181–82 (describing Standard‘s price-cutting tactics 
in the Boston market that forced Cornplanter to sign an agreement surrendering ―80 percent of its sales 
along with its pricing autonomy‖). 
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2.  Countervailing Evidence of Standard‘s Price Predation 
While McGee‘s work may raise questions about whether the trial 
evidence sufficed to establish predatory pricing, more recent research 
suggests that Standard did price below cost.54 Economists James Dalton 
and Louis Esposito reexamined the trial record from Standard Oil and 
concluded that ―the Record contains considerable evidence of predatory 
pricing. Simply stated, the Record does not support McGee‘s conclusion 
that Standard Oil did not engage in predatory pricing.‖55 Their research 
reopens the question of whether Standard Oil represents an example of 
predatory pricing or an example of an antitrust false positive. 
The first hurdle in determining whether Standard engaged in predatory 
pricing is definitional. Despite the fact that predatory pricing has been an 
antitrust violation for a century, antitrust jurisprudence still lacks a uniform 
definition of below-cost pricing. The Supreme Court has consistently 
avoided the issue.56 As of the mid-1970s, the Areeda-Turner test, which 
uses average variable cost as a proxy for marginal cost,57 has been the 
starting point for most discussions about measuring cost, but it is not the 
final word.58 In his 1958 article, however, McGee never defined predatory 
pricing. He proffered no measure of cost, and he never attempted to show 
that Standard‘s prices always exceeded a defined measure of cost. 
In their response to McGee‘s article, Dalton and Esposito employed a 
broad definition of predatory pricing. Their characterization included 
―lower[ing] price in the short run below the price of the entrant . . . [until] 
the price cut . . . eliminated a rival . . . and then increas[ing] the price.‖59 
This definition of predatory pricing is problematic because it also captures 
monopolization by an efficient firm that never charges a price below its 
cost. The monopolist in this scenario has not engaged in predatory conduct 
to acquire its monopoly, and antitrust law does not condemn monopoly 
 
 54.  See, e.g., id. at 171–83 (describing Standard‘s pricing below cost in a number of specific 
instances). 
 55. Id. at 158. 
 56. See Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222 n.1 
(1993) (―Because the parties in this case agree that the relevant measure of cost is average variable cost, 
however, we again decline to resolve the conflict among the lower courts over the appropriate measure 
of cost.‖ (citations omitted)). 
 57. Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 
2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 733 (1975). 
 58. McGahee v. N. Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1495 (11th Cir. 1988) (describing the 
Areeda-Turner test as like the Venus de Milo: ―much admired and often discussed, but rarely 
embraced‖ (citations omitted)). 
 59. Dalton & Esposito, supra note 25, at 164. 
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pricing by a legal monopolist.60 
Despite these definitional deficiencies, Dalton and Esposito identified 
several instances in which Standard charged a price below cost.61 For 
example, in order to eliminate a major competitor in the South, Red C, 
―Standard reduced its price below its variable costs.‖62 Dalton and Esposito 
also showed that testimony from Standard‘s own managers and salesmen 
demonstrated some instances of Standard pricing below variable cost in the 
Midwest.63 Similarly, the general manager in charge of setting Standard‘s 
prices in Minnesota noted that Standard lost money on sales in Minneapolis 
in order to defeat its competitors there.64 Standard‘s sales agent for the state 
of New York also ―testified that Standard priced below its own costs ‗if we 
were forced to.‘‖65 Moreover, Dalton and Esposito presented evidence of 
Standard pricing below cost in Boston66 and Colorado.67 
In particular, Dalton and Esposito provided a different interpretation 
of Standard‘s relationship with Cornplanter. As noted above, McGee 
asserted that Standard merely responded to Cornplanter‘s low prices. 
Dalton and Esposito, though, concluded: 
Our analysis of the evidence in the Record indicates that Standard did 
engage in predatory pricing against Cornplanter in Minnesota, Troy, and 
Boston. Standard‘s executive in charge of sales testified that Standard 
priced below its costs when it encountered Cornplanter in Minnesota. 
Standard‘s agent in Troy testified that Standard used selective pricing 
below its costs after Cornplanter tried to enter the Troy market. Standard 
 
 60. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 147, 157 
(2005) (―We do not condemn the monopolist who cuts price to an above cost level because it knew that 
a rival would be forced to exit from the market. Such behavior is completely consistent with our 
conception of proper competition.‖). Cf. Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 
YALE L.J. 941, 952 (2002). 
 61. See Dalton & Esposito, supra note 25, at 171–83 (describing several specific instances in 
which Standard charged a price below cost).  
 62. Id. at 171. 
 63. See id. at 174 (discussing the testimony of Standard managers and salesmen which showed 
Standard pricing below variable cost in Missouri and eastern Kansas). Some data also provide implicit 
evidence of price below cost. For example, in the Midwest, ―Standard's manager at St. Joe instructed G. 
Kuenster to get [Standard competitor] SS&T's business by reducing price, and on one occasion he 
reduced price from 12 cents a gallon to 5 cents a gallon when the cost of freight alone was 2 cents a 
gallon.‖ Id. at 175 (citation omitted). 
 64. Id. at 180. See also id. (―Crenshaw broadened the geographic scope of predatory pricing to 
the state of Minnesota when he acknowledged that Standard had sold oil at a loss in the state of 
Minnesota for most of 1903 and 1904.‖ (citation omitted)). 
 65. Id. at 181 (citation omitted). 
 66. See id. at 182. 
 67. See id. at 184. 
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disciplined Cornplanter when Standard priced below its costs when 
Cornplanter entered Boston-area markets, causing Cornplanter to yield 
significant sales to Standard after which Standard raised the price. Once 
again, Standard‘s pricing behavior in the Cornplanter case can best be 
understood using a simple model of selective price cutting aimed at 
disciplining or eliminating a rival.68 
Examining the trial record, Dalton and Esposito concluded that in order to 
regain its customers from Cornplanter, Standard charged a price ―below its 
own variable costs.‖69 
In addition to Dalton and Esposito‘s reexamination of the trial record, 
other sources provide evidence of Standard‘s predatory pricing that goes 
beyond the trial record. For example, Ida Tarbell‘s investigation found 
evidence of price predation.70 When Standard‘s powerful director H.H. 
Rogers heard that McClure‘s magazine was planning an extensive report on 
Standard, he asked his good friend Mark Twain to approach McClure’s 
publisher—also a friend of Twain‘s.71 Twain provided the necessary 
introductions between Rogers and Tarbell, who was writing the report.72 
Daniel Yergin noted that for two years, Tarbell ―met regularly with 
Rogers. . . . She was sometimes even granted the use of a desk [at 
Standard‘s offices] at 26 Broadway. She would bring case histories to 
Rogers, and he would provide documents, figures, justifications, 
explanations, interpretations. Rogers was surprisingly candid with 
Tarbell.‖73 Thus, Tarbell is a credible source on the issue of price predation 
because she had substantial access to Standard‘s records. Tarbell reported 
numerous instances of Standard charging a price below its cost.74 
On the heels of Tarbell‘s expose, the Bureau published its own multi-
volume study of the American petroleum industry, with special emphasis 
on Standard‘s pricing strategy.75 The study controlled for date, grade of 
product, method of delivery, and accuracy of data.76 With hundreds of 
pages of data, the government report demonstrated how Standard charged 
monopoly prices in markets where it faced no meaningful competition and 
engaged in price wars against rivals to drive them from competitive 
 
 68. Id. at 183. 
 69. Id. at 181. 
 70. TARBELL, supra note 1, at 1, 31–63.  
 71. See YERGIN, supra note 7, at 103. 
 72. See id. 
 73. Id. at 104. 
 74. See TARBELL, supra note 1, at 1.  
 75. U.S. BUREAU OF CORPS., REPORT ON PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, supra note 40, at 70, 523–67. 
 76. Id. at 491–92. 
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markets.77 The study noted that ―[w]hen necessary, [Standard] puts the 
prices in a given locality down even below its own cost of manufacture, 
transportation, and delivery.‖78 For example, the study presented data to 
show that in 1896, Standard‘s arm in St. Louis, the Waters Pierce Oil 
Company, launched ―a bitter attack upon certain new independent 
concerns‖ and reduced the price so low that the previous 2.4 cents per 
gallon profit was converted into a 1.3 cents per gallon loss.79 This would 
appear to be a classic case of predatory pricing. Surprisingly, McGee never 
mentioned the Bureau‘s study. 
More recently, in his biography of John D. Rockefeller, Ron Chernow 
reported much evidence of Standard‘s predatory pricing.80 Despite 
assertions that Standard only rarely priced below cost, Chernow concluded 
that ―Rockefeller‘s files are so rife with references to this practice‖ of 
predatory pricing that the record suggests widespread price predation by 
Standard.81 
Taken together, these multiple sources suggest two conclusions. First, 
McGee was too quick to assert that the trial record lacked any evidence of 
predatory pricing. Second, evidence beyond the trial record indicates that 
Standard engaged in predatory pricing and thus it is inappropriate to 
conclude that Standard did not do so based solely on a reading of the trial 
record. 
B.  CLAIM: PREDATORY PRICING DOES NOT HAPPEN 
From his study of the Standard Oil case, McGee suggested that 
predatory pricing is rare if it occurs at all.82 Scholars invoke McGee for the 
propositions that predatory pricing is ―seldom used,‖83 ―extremely rare,‖84 
and ―does not exist.‖85 Courts, including in the Matsushita opinion, have 
 
 77. See id. at 438.  
 78. Id. at 438. See also id. at 438. (―Sometimes, however, the prices to retail dealers have also 
been cut far below the Standard's own cost.‖). 
 79. Id. at 441. 
 80. See RON CHERNOW, TITAN: THE LIFE OF JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, SR. 258 (1998) (quoting 
1886 letter from Standard executive to J.D. Rockefeller, suggesting that Standard sold a quarter of his 
oil at cost or below). 
 81. Id.  
 82. See McGee, supra note 18, at 157.  
 83. William H. Jordan, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: The Problem of State “Sales 
Below Cost” Statutes, 44 EMORY L.J. 267, 274 (1995) (citing McGee, supra note 18, at 168). 
 84. Daniel R. Fischel, Andrew M. Rosenfield & Robert S. Stillman, The Regulation of Banks and 
Bank Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REV. 301, 327 (1987) (citing only McGee, supra note 18, at 137). 
 85. Yeomin Yoon, The Korean Chip Dumping Controversy: Are They Accused of Violating an 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2443473
LESLIE - JCI.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 12/20/2012  4:02 PM 
2012] THE REVISIONIST HISTORY OF STANDARD OIL 589 
employed McGee‘s article about Standard Oil to assert the non-existence 
of predatory pricing. McGee‘s work, however, simply does not prove such 
a sweeping proposition. If Standard actually engaged in predatory pricing, 
then that shows that predatory pricing is something that dominant firms 
attempt and can use to successfully monopolize a market. If, in contrast, 
Standard did not engage in predatory pricing, that does not prove the broad 
thesis that firms do not engage in predatory pricing or that predatory 
pricing is not a mechanism to monopolize a market. At most, the revisionist 
history could support the hypothesis that predatory pricing claims are 
susceptible to false positives. 
In addition to this logical fallacy, McGee‘s theoretical arguments—
presented in the guise of an empirical case study86—are also suspect. Led 
by McGee, scholars have made several arguments to support their position 
that predatory pricing is inherently irrational and, therefore, must not occur. 
In particular, McGee advanced three arguments: (1) predatory pricing 
should not occur because the targets of predation can re-enter the market 
after prices rise again; (2) firms do not engage in predatory pricing because 
the predator will have to sustain losses several times greater than the losses 
imposed on its rivals; and (3) Standard would not have engaged in 
predation because mergers were cheaper.87 
Far from proving the irrationality of predatory pricing, an examination 
of Standard‘s practices undermines McGee‘s theoretical arguments. 
1.  Re-Entry and New Entry 
McGee argued that predatory pricing cannot succeed because even if 
Standard successfully drove a rival from the market, that rival would 
simply re-enter the market once Standard began charging a 
supracompetitive price.88 McGee speculated that ―at some stage of the 
game the competitors may simply shut down operations temporarily, letting 
the monopolist take all the business (and all the losses), then simply resume 
operations when he raises prices again.‖89 McGee, in turn, influenced 
Robert Bork, who also asserted that the target of predation can stop 
operation temporarily, paying its fixed costs and waiting until the price 
 
Unjust Law?, 19 N.C. J. INT‘L L. & COM. REG. 247, 263–64 & n.101 (1994) (citing McGee, supra note 
18, at 137–69).  
 86. See infra notes 128–46 and accompanying text (explaining why McGee‘s work is theoretical, 
not empirical). 
 87. See McGee, supra note 18, at 138–43.  
 88. Id. at 140.  
 89. McGee, supra note 18, at 140. See also John S. McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J. L. 
& ECON. 289, 297 (1980). 
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rises again, and then re-enter the market.90 Bork argued that predatory 
pricing cannot succeed, in part, because ―ease of entry will be symmetrical 
with ease of exit.‖91 
The facts of Standard Oil undermine McGee‘s and Bork‘s theoretical 
arguments. Both assert that targets of price predation will re-enter the 
market after the predator increases the price.92 That assertion is a theory 
that is subject to empirical proof. In his study of Standard, McGee opines, 
If price does not cover average variable costs, the operation is 
suspended. This will often leave the plant wholly intact. . . . [P]hysical 
capacity remains, and will be brought back into play by some 
opportunist once the monopolizer raises prices to enjoy the fruits of the 
battle he has spent so much in winning.93  
Despite his assertions that predation ―often‖ leaves a competitor‘s capacity 
intact and that rivals ―will‖ re-enter the market, McGee provides no 
empirical evidence of this actually happening.94 Standard‘s history, by 
contrast, shows examples of successful predation followed by no re-entry.95 
Standard successfully signaled its rivals that if they re-entered the market in 
response to Standard‘s post-predation monopoly pricing, Standard would 
slash prices again until the entrant was driven from the market at a loss.96 
For example, when the Pure Oil Company entered the New York market, 
Standard reduced its price from 9.5 cents to 5.5 cents per gallon.97 The Pure 
Oil Company faced ―a similar experience . . . when it entered the 
Philadelphia market[, which was] merely typical of what has occurred over 
and over again when an independent refiner has entered a market in 
competition with the Standard Oil Company.‖98 Because Standard could 
 
 90. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 151 (1978). 
 91. Id. at 149. See also id. at 153 (―The easier it is to drive a firm from the market, the easier it 
will be for that firm or another to reenter once the predator begins to collect his monopoly profits. 
Conversely, the more difficult entry is, the more difficult and expensive it will be to drive a rival out.‖). 
 92. See McGee, supra note 18, at 140; BORK, supra note 90, at 151.  
 93. McGee, supra note 18, at 140–41. 
 94. Neither does Bork. 
 95. See Dalton & Esposito, supra note 25, at 170 (―Standard successfully signaled Red C that 
immediate re-entry was not a feasible strategy.‖). 
 96. See U.S. BUREAU OF CORPS., REPORT ON PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, supra note 40, at 668 (―For 
the independent to attempt to establish himself in another town or section merely because prices are 
high there would involve additional expense, only to invite another disastrous conflict.‖). 
 97. U.S. BUREAU OF CORPS., REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS ON THE 
TRANSPORTATION OF PETROLEUM 88 (1906) [hereinafter U.S. BUREAU OF CORPS., REPORT ON 
TRANSPORTATION OF PETROLEUM]. 
 98. Id.  
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easily render re-entry unprofitable, Standard could simultaneously charge a 
monopoly price while deterring re-entry.99 
Similarly, despite Bork‘s unsubstantiated assertion to the contrary, 
ease of entry is likely to be asymmetrical with ease of exit. It is far easier to 
sell one‘s assets and to exit a market than to create capacity and enter a 
market. In particular, it is simpler to sell a refinery than to build one. The 
history of Standard Oil shows this lack of either re-entry by vanquished 
firms or new entry by would-be competitors. For example, Dalton and 
Esposito discuss how one Standard subsidiary used price predation to drive 
a rival, the Rocky Mountain Oil Company, from the market.100 After Rocky 
Mountain‘s exit, Standard again charged the monopoly price.101 McGee 
made much of the fact that two new refineries—Spring Valley and 
Boulder—entered the market, and he asserted that this entry ―suggests 
either that memories are short; or that those who were familiar with the 
episode did not regard the Rocky Mountain incident as a case of predatory 
price cutting.‖102 But McGee glosses over the fact that this new entry 
occurred eleven years after Standard‘s successful predation.103 The target 
exited the market and re-entry by the target did not occur. New entrants did 
not arrive until eleven years later. Exit was swift and easy; entry was 
considerably harder, or at least more time consuming. And in the ensuing 
decade, Standard profited handsomely. 
In short, the targets of Standard‘s predation did not temporarily 
suspend operations and re-enter once Standard raised the price. 
Furthermore, Standard‘s monopoly pricing did not induce rapid entry that 
would render price predation not cost beneficial. 
2.  Disproportionate Losses 
McGee argued that Standard would not have charged a price below 
cost because, even if it had greater financial reserves than its smaller 
 
 99. U.S. BUREAU OF CORPS., REPORT ON PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, supra note 40, at xli 
(―Competitors, while theoretically able, in view of these high prices, to reenter such markets, were 
practically prevented from doing so, owing to the fact that the Standard, by reason of its advantage in 
rail rates, could, and would, at any time when necessary, again depress prices to a point where such 
competitors would again be forced to conduct their business at a loss.‖). 
 100. See Dalton & Esposito, supra note 25, at 183–87. 
 101. Id. at 185–86 (―In fact, the market price returned to 15 cents per gallon after Rocky Mountain 
exited the market, the exact same price that existed prior to Rocky Mountain's entry into the market.‖). 
 102. McGee, supra note 18, at 151. 
 103. See Dalton & Esposito, supra note 25, at 186 (―With respect to the question of entry, it is 
true, as McGee asserts, that two new independent refineries were built in the region. However, those 
refineries, in Spring Valley and Boulder, were built in 1905–1906, 11 years after the price war that 
eliminated Rocky Mountain Oil.‖(citation omitted)). 
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competitors, it would suffer disproportionately higher losses.104 He asserted 
that the predator would be  
in the position of selling more—and therefore losing more—than his 
competitors. Standard‘s market share was often 75 per cent or more. In 
the 75 per cent case the monopolizer would sell three times as much as 
all competitors taken together, and, on the assumption of equal unit 
costs, would lose roughly three times as much as all of them taken 
together.105 
 Later economists signed on to McGee‘s reasoning and made the numbers 
even more stark: ―If I am selling 90 percent of all petroleum, a particular 
competitor is selling 1 percent, and we both sell at the same price and have 
the same average cost, I lose $90 for every $1 he loses.‖106 Bork embraced 
McGee‘s assertion and popularized it even further, declaring that ―price 
cutting, though conventionally viewed with grave suspicion, does not 
provide a likely means of predation because it requires the predator to bear 
losses that are much larger, both absolutely and proportionally, than those 
inflicted on the intended victim.‖107 
The revisionist history assumes that the predator reduces the price 
below cost for all of its sales.108 Yet Standard implemented its pricing 
strategy so as to not reduce price across its entire output. First, Standard 
identified those buyers who were using a particular seller that Standard had 
targeted for elimination. Standard engaged in substantial industrial 
espionage to collect this information. Chernow explained 
Rockefeller fostered an extensive intelligence network, assembling thick 
card catalogs with monthly reports from field agents, showing every 
barrel of oil sold by independent marketers in their territory. From 26 
Broadway, the titan could peer into the most distant corners of his realm. 
Standard Oil spies collected much of this information from grocers and 
railway-freight agents. One Cleveland refiner discovered that Standard 
paid his bookkeeper twenty-five dollars a month to provide information 
on his shipments.109 
 
 104. See McGee, supra note 18, at 140.  
 105. Id. 
 106. FRIEDMAN, supra note 27, at 249. 
 107. BORK, supra note 90, at 148. 
 108. See id. at 151. 
 109. CHERNOW, supra note 74, at 256. See also U.S. BUREAU OF CORPS., REPORT ON PETROLEUM 
INDUSTRY, supra note 40, at 58 (―Again, the Standard maintains an elaborate system of espionage on 
the business of independent concerns, in particular securing almost complete reports of their receipts 
and shipments of oil, by bribing railroad employees. This practice enables the Standard to direct its 
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Standard maintained databases so that it knew which particular 
customers it should entice with below-cost prices.110 According to the 
testimony from Standard‘s own agents, Standard offered lower prices or 
rebates only to those buyers making purchases from independent refiners, 
not to Standard‘s own customers.111 
Standard, however, did not simply reduce the price to non-Standard 
customers, perhaps because this could result in resentment from its current 
customers. Instead, Standard created a series of fake oil companies that 
appeared to be independent refiners. Standard created these new companies 
as fighting brands; each was ―merely a Standard jobbing house which 
makes no oil, and which conceals its real identity under a misleading 
name.‖112 These bogus companies would sell oil to customers of Standard‘s 
competitors at prices below cost.113 Dalton and Esposito describe how 
Standard used shell firms to deploy its pricing strategy in the South: 
Standard Oil used as many as seven bogus companies during its 
competition with Red C to implement this type of selective price cutting: 
Eureka, Eagle, Southern Oil Company of Richmond, Dixie Oil Works, 
Davidson Oil Company, Paragon Oil, and Home Safety Oil Delivery. 
Generally speaking, a bogus wagon was owned by Standard Oil but was 
perceived by customers as representing a marketing company 
independent of Standard. The purpose of a bogus wagon was to undercut 
the prices to customers of Standard‘s rivals while allowing Standard to 
sell at higher prices to its own customers in the same geographic 
market.114 
This strategy allowed Standard to engage in price discrimination 
within a single market, charging higher prices to customers who purchased 
 
policy of local price cutting in the most effective manner.‖); id. at 669. 
 110. See Dalton & Esposito, supra note 25, at 161 (―Standard also employed a sophisticated and 
extensive intelligence network. Its employees identified the shipments and customer destinations of 
wholesalers of competing refiners using information obtained from agents of the railroads, retailers of 
refined oil products, and other employees of Standard. Standard maintained this information in an 
elaborate card catalogue that was then used to direct its sales force to capture or recapture the customers 
of rival refiners.‖); id. at 168 (―Standard responded to the threat of losing customers by selectively 
reducing its prices. Standard Oil of Kentucky had developed a customer database for the geographic 
markets in which it operated and used it to identify customers that had defected to Red C.‖). 
 111. Id. at 175 (discussing testimony from Standard agents in Kansas City). See e.g., id. (―H. C. 
Yungling testified that he was instructed to give rebates only to customers of [Standard competitor] 
SS&T.‖). 
 112. TARBELL, supra note 1, at 51. 
 113. Id. at 51–52 (―In these raids on peddlers of independent oil, refined oil has been sold in 
different cities at the doors of consumers at less than crude oil was bringing at the wells, and several 
cents per gallon less than it was selling to wholesale dealers in refined.‖). 
 114. Dalton & Esposito, supra note 25, at 169 (citations omitted). 
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Standard-brand oil and lower prices to its rivals‘ customers.115 
After Standard succeeded in driving its rival from the market, the 
bogus company would also depart, leaving buyers with but one option: 
purchase oil from Standard. McGee‘s failure to consider Standard‘s ability 
to minimize losses associated with predation is surprising given that it was 
well known that Standard Oil created bogus companies to engage in 
targeted predation. Ida Tarbell explained Standard‘s entire operation for 
targeted predation: 
The marketing department of the Standard Oil Company is organised to 
cover the entire country, and aims to sell all the oil sold in each of its 
divisions. To forestall or meet competition it has organised an elaborate 
secret service for locating the quantity, quality, and selling price of 
independent shipments. Having located an order for independent oil with 
a dealer, it persuades him, if possible, to countermand the order. If this is 
impossible, it threatens ―predatory competition,‖ that is, to sell at cost or 
less, until the rival is worn out. If the dealer still is obstinate, it institutes 
an ―Oil War.‖ In late years the cutting and the ―Oil Wars‖ are often 
intrusted to so-called ―bogus‖ companies, who retire when the real 
independent is put out of the way.116 
For McGee, Bork, and others to insist that a monopolist attempting 
price predation must incur losses over all of its sales is empirically wrong. 
McGee noted the existence of the bogus companies.117 But he failed to 
appreciate how their existence undermines his argument about 
disproportionate losses. In particular, McGee never explained why 
Standard‘s bogus firms would sell at a loss118 or why the bogus companies 
would cease to exist once Standard had driven its rival from the market, as 
Tarbell described. In short, McGee did not understand how Standard used 
targeted price cuts by shell companies to drive competitors from the market 
and then raised price after its rivals exited.119 
 
 115. Id. at 175 (―E. M. Wilhoit had been an agent for Standard in Kansas City. He used the 
information from the database on competitors to reduce prices to customers of competing wholesalers 
while charging the higher price to Standard's customers.‖); U.S. BUREAU OF CORPS., REPORT ON 
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, supra note 40, at 668–69 (explaining that by using bogus firms, Standard ―can 
cut prices to the particular customers of independents without being under the necessity of reducing the 
profits on its entire volume of business in the locality by a general cutting of prices‖). 
 116. TARBELL, supra note 1, at 60–61. 
 117. McGee, supra note 18, at 158. 
 118. See U.S. BUREAU OF CORPS., REPORT ON PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, supra note 40, at 438 
(―Instances have been known where the Standard has virtually given oil away to destroy the business of 
independent concerns. These extraordinary cuts are perhaps most often made in the form of sales to 
consumers by bogus-independent concerns.‖). 
 119. See, e.g., Dalton & Esposito, supra note 25, at 175 (―Waters-Pierce [a Standard subsidiary] 
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In sum, Standard price discriminated both across geographic markets 
and within geographic markets. Standard‘s exploits show how even within 
a single geographic market, a monopolist can target a rival‘s customers 
through fighting brands, while not charging a predatory price to its current 
customers at a loss. 
3.  Standard Oil and Mergers 
McGee argued that instead of using predatory pricing, Standard 
merged its way to market dominance by acquiring independent refiners. He 
believed that merger to monopoly was far more cost effective than 
predation. McGee asserted that compared to predatory pricing, ―[a] simpler 
technique did exist, and Standard used it. Unless there are legal restraints, 
anyone can monopolize an industry through mergers and acquisitions, 
paying for the acquisitions by permitting participation of the former owners 
in the expected monopoly gains.‖120 In essence, Standard and its former 
adversary would simply share the monopoly profits, with the exiting rival 
getting its take on the front end. 
While McGee is correct that Standard did acquire many formerly 
independent refineries, the fact of these acquisitions does not negate the 
evidence that Standard also employed predatory pricing. There are several 
problems with McGee‘s analysis on this point. First, McGee suggested that 
―instead of fighting, the would-be monopolist bought out his competitors 
directly.‖121 But Standard did fight. There is no question that Standard 
reduced its prices considerably when it faced competition. Standard did 
forego substantial profits prior to merger. Whether these dramatically lower 
prices were below an appropriate measure of cost determines whether 
Standard‘s conduct constitutes predatory pricing, but Standard did in fact 
sacrifice sizeable amounts of money in the lead up to its acquisitions.122 
Second, McGee simply assumed a nationwide assemblage of 
independent refiners willing to sell out to Standard. McGee asserted that 
―[a]nything above the competitive value of their firms should be enough to 
buy them.‖123 But businesspeople do not generally build their empires in 
the hopes of selling their company at ―anything above‖ market value to the 
 
gave rebates to these customers and then raised the market price once [competitor] SS&T had been 
suppressed.‖).  
 120. See McGee, supra note 18, at 139. 
 121. Id.  
 122. See supra text accompanying note 118. 
 123. McGee, supra note 18, at 139.  
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first willing buyer.124 Elizabeth Granitz and Benjamin Klein have explained 
why Standard‘s rival ―refiners had no incentive to sell out to Standard‖ 
because they could free ride on the price umbrella created by Standard.125 
Perhaps anticipating this response, McGee suggested that ―Even supposing 
that the competitors would not sell for competitive value, it is difficult to 
see why the predator would be unwilling to take the amount that he would 
otherwise spend in price wars and pay it as a bonus.‖126 Depending on the 
size of this ―bonus,‖ acquisition costs can dwarf the competitive value of 
the target. For example, in its quest to monopolize the market for tin cans, 
American Can paid upwards of twenty-five times the market value of 
independent can-making factories.127 At a certain point, the expected cost 
of acquisition exceeds the expected cost of predation. More importantly, 
McGee focused on the wrong decisionmaker. The issue is not the 
predator‘s willingness to pay extra; it is the target‘s unwillingness to sell 
its business concern. If an independent refiner does not wish to be acquired, 
Standard would need to ―soften it up,‖ as the following paragraph argues. 
Third, McGee failed to appreciate how predatory pricing can play a 
critical role in convincing unwilling targets to sell out to a monopolist. 
Price predation and acquisition of rivals work in tandem. The threat of 
price predation can convert an intransigent rival into a willing seller and 
―[t]he price at which smaller competitors could be bought out would be 
driven down by the very threat of ruin, if it appeared likely that the threat 
would be carried out.‖128 For example, in his study of the consolidation of 
the tobacco industry that took place contemporaneously with the building 
of Standard‘s monopoly, Malcolm Burns has demonstrated that predatory 
pricing can reduce the price that a dominant firm must pay to acquire a 
competitor.129 
 
 124. Some targets would not sell out to Standard. Indeed, McGee noted that Standard had ―twice 
tried to purchase the Red C group but failed.‖ Id. at 154. 
 125. Elizabeth Granitz & Benjamin Klein, Monopolization By “Raising Rivals’ Costs”: The 
Standard Oil Case, 39 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1996) (―Contrary to McGee‘s analysis, however, refiners had 
no incentive to sell out to Standard. Once they recognized that Rockefeller was likely to succeed, 
individual refiners would be better off holding out and remaining outside the Standard consolidation, 
‗free riding‘ on the higher industry price that Standard would create by its monopolistic restriction of 
output.‖). 
 126. McGee, supra note 18, at 139–40. 
 127. United States v. Am. Can Co., 230 F. 859, 870 (D. Md. 1916). 
 128. Robert C. Brooks, Jr., Injury to Competition Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 109 U. PA. L. 
REV. 777, 788 (1961) (emphasis omitted) (criticizing McGee). 
 129. Malcolm R. Burns, Predatory Pricing and the Acquisition Cost of Competitors, 94 J. POL. 
ECON. 266, 290–91 (1986) (criticizing McGee). 
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McGee rejected this explanation as ―not at all likely.‖130 Bork, too, 
asserted that a Standard Oil strategy of predatory pricing followed by 
acquisition is ―unattractive and improbable.‖131 Neither scholar, however, 
presented any empirical evidence; more importantly, neither discussed 
Standard‘s pricing prior to acquisitions. 
Much evidence suggests that Standard used targeted price cuts to 
render its rivals unprofitable and subject to easier and less costly 
acquisition.132 When firms refused to be acquired, Standard could respond 
with predatory pricing. Standard turned reluctant targets into public 
examples of what would happen to refiners who resisted acquisition.  
For example, Rockefeller wrote, 
[Refiners] failing to sell out [to Standard] on good high prices . . . will be 
sick unto death now having failed in their wicked scheme. A good 
sweating will be healthy for them and they ought to have it, and it is not 
money lost to us to have other people see them get it.133  
Standard was essentially purchasing a reputation for predation, which 
would make its future threats more credible and make other rivals 
more amenable to acquisition.134 
In short, McGee and his subsequent supporters overclaimed by 
suggesting that McGee‘s study proves that predatory pricing does not 
happen. In reality, a close examination of Standard‘s practices undermines 
McGee‘s theoretical argument against predatory pricing taking place. 
C.  CLAIM: PREDATORY PRICING INHERENTLY FAILS 
McGee‘s third claim is perhaps his most bold. After concluding that 
 
 130. McGee, supra note 18, at 141. 
 131. BORK, supra note 90, at 153.  
 132. See Granitz & Klein, supra note 125, at 38 n.100. The fact that firms were driven from the 
market does not prove that Standard charged a price below cost as opposed to Standard taking 
advantage of the secret railroad rebates. See infra text accompanying notes 138–41 . But this does show 
that Standard used a carrot-and-stick approach—the stick being a threat to impose losses on its rivals 
until they sold out to Standard, the carrot. 
 133. 2 ALLAN NEVINS, JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER: THE HEROIC AGE OF AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 68 
(1940) (quoting Letter from John D. Rockefeller, Founder, Standard Oil (Mar. 11, 1878)). 
 134. Leslie, supra note 36, at 298 (―A dominant firm may employ predatory pricing to purchase a 
reputation for aggression.‖); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. 
L. REV. 925, 939 (1979) (―There is, however, a deeper problem with the McGee argument: it neglects 
strategic considerations. Assume that it is lawful to buy a rival. It does not follow that a firm will never 
resort to predatory pricing. After all, it wants to minimize the price at which it buys its rivals, and that 
price will be lower if it can convince them of its willingness to drive them out of business unless they 
sell out on its terms. One way to convince them of this is to engage in predatory pricing from time to 
time.‖). 
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Standard never used predatory pricing to drive rivals from the market, 
McGee asserts that ―if [Standard] tried, it did not work.‖135 Subsequent 
scholars have invoked McGee‘s article for the following propositions: 
―predation is rarely, if ever, a profitable strategy‖;136 ―attempted predation 
is extremely rare, and successful predation even rarer still‖;137 ―successful 
predatory pricing is rare or nonexistent‖;138 ―predatory pricing . . . has 
failed whenever it has been tried.‖139 These are empirical statements of fact 
for which McGee‘s article simply provides no empirical support. 
This third claim rings particularly hollow. First, it is a bald assertion 
that is inconsistent with McGee‘s underlying thesis that there is not ―a 
single instance in which Standard used predatory price cutting.‖140 If this 
central thesis of McGee‘s article is true, then it is impossible for its author 
to claim that when Standard employed predatory pricing, the strategy 
failed. If Standard never attempted predatory pricing, it could neither have 
failed nor succeeded. Both of McGee‘s assertions cannot simultaneously be 
true. Arguing in the alternative may be an acceptable legal strategy, as 
when a defendant in a breach of contract lawsuit argues that there was no 
contract but, if there was a contract, the defendant did not breach. But this 
form of argumentation is less persuasive in the context of factual, as 
opposed to legal, questions. McGee is wrong to assert both that Standard 
never engaged in predatory pricing and that ―if it tried, it did not work.‖141 
McGee in no way shows that Standard‘s efforts at predatory pricing were 
empirically unprofitable. Instead, he argues that there were no attempts at 
predatory pricing. 
Second, if Standard did engage in predatory pricing, by what measure 
did it ―not work‖? McGee never puts forward criteria or a metric for 
judging whether an attempt at predatory pricing has ―worked.‖ Standard 
Oil was a highly profitable monopolist that earned high profits in the local 
markets that it dominated. If Standard engaged in predatory pricing, it 
 
 135. McGee, supra note 18, at 157. 
 136. Malcolm B. Coate & Jeffrey H. Fischer, Can Post-Chicago Economics Survive Daubert?, 34 
AKRON L. REV. 795, 824 (2001) (citing McGee, supra note 18). 
 137. Daniel R. Fischel, Andrew M. Rosenfield & Robert S. Stillman, The Regulation of Banks and 
Bank Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REV. 301, 327 n.79 (1987) (citing McGee, supra note 18). 
 138. William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 652, 669 
n.34 (1983) (citing McGee, supra note 18, among others). 
 139. Yoon, supra note 85, at 263–64 (citing McGee). In a similar vein, another commentator 
asserted that ―Professor McGee demonstrated that predatory pricing can never be implemented 
profitably in a manner that harms consumers.‖ Pierce, supra note 24, at 1106.  
 140. McGee, supra note 18, at 157.  
 141. Id.  
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would seem to have succeeded. After all, it monopolized the market and 
earned considerable profits as a result.142 If Standard Oil used predatory 
pricing, then a case study of the company shows that predatory pricing 
could be profitable, not the opposite as claimed by McGee and his 
followers. 
V.  THEORY VERSUS EMPIRICISM 
McGee‘s article has been one of the most influential in antitrust 
law.143 This part asks why. One response might be that the article is an 
important empirical study of a major early Supreme Court antitrust opinion. 
The belief that McGee‘s article is empirical is widespread. Scholars refer to 
McGee‘s article as an ―empirical study,‖144 as do courts.145 That 
description is generous. 
At base, McGee‘s article is not an empirical case study. An empirical 
predatory pricing study would have examined Standard‘s actual price and 
cost in each of these markets and used that data to determine whether 
Standard charged a price below cost. In asserting that Standard never 
engaged in below-cost pricing, McGee never defined cost, never 
enumerated Standard‘s actual prices, and never actually compared cost to 
price. As Joseph Brodley has explained, McGee presented ―essentially ad 
hoc case studies that rely on impressionistic readings of case records.‖146 
McGee‘s article is a theoretical polemic masquerading as an empirical case 
study.147 McGee provided no empirical evidence to support his theoretical 
assertions. For example, McGee provides no examples of re-entry in 
response to Standard‘s post-predation price hikes. 
Perhaps the general lack of empiricism in McGee‘s article is best 
 
 142. Dalton & Esposito, supra note 25, at 161. 
 143. See supra Part III.  
 144. See, e.g., Michael A. Salinger, The Insights of Joseph Brodley’s Scholarship for the Current 
Debates over the Antitrust Treatment of Single-Firm Conduct, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1543, 1546 n.19 (2010) 
(referring to McGee as ―empirical study‖); C. Scott Hemphill, Note, The Role of Recoupment in 
Predatory Pricing Analyses, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1581, 1601 n.60 (2001) (same); The Supreme Court, 
1992 Term-Leading Cases, 107 HARV. L. REV. 322, 329 (1993) (same). 
 145. See, e.g., Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1196 (3d Cir. 1995).  
 146. See Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling Private 
Incentives and Public Enforcement Goals, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1, 55 n.222 (1995). 
 147. See Chris Sagers, “Rarely Tried, and . . . Rarely Successful”: Theoretically Impossible Price 
Predation Among the Airlines, 74 J. AIR L. & COM. 919, 927–28 (2009) (―The case against predation 
remains almost exclusively theoretical. It rests heavily on John McGee‘s seminal paper, which is said to 
have been ‗empirical‘ insofar as he reviewed extant historical evidence about the Standard Oil 
monopoly. [T]he paper‘s influence has followed almost exclusively from its theoretical 
underpinnings.‖). 
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illustrated by his conclusion that ―Standard did not systematically, if ever, 
use local price cutting in retailing, or anywhere else, to reduce 
competition.‖148 McGee appears to be talking about price discrimination, as 
opposed to predatory pricing.149 Again, McGee presents no data. His 
assertion is completely at odds with the hundreds of pages of actual price 
data analysis in the Bureau of Corporations‘ reports on petroleum markets. 
The study found the evidence of Standard‘s local price cutting to be 
―absolutely conclusive.‖150 For example, Standard sold oil in San 
Francisco, across the bay from its refinery, at 12.5 cents while it charged 
7.5 cents (delivery included) in Los Angeles for oil from that same Bay 
Area refinery.151 Standard thus charged significantly less for oil that had to 
be transported over 300 miles more.152 McGee never mentioned the Bureau 
of Corporations‘ study or addressed its data. 
Yet if McGee‘s unqualified assertion about local price cutting is 
clearly wrong, that should cast doubt on his assertion about Standard‘s 
alleged predatory pricing, for which McGee also presents no actual price 
data to support his sweeping conclusions. The evidence shows that 
Standard did reduce its price to drive competitors from the market, only to 
raise price considerably once it had the market to itself. The issue remains, 
however, whether the lower prices during these price wars were below 
Standard‘s cost. McGee argued that Standard reduced its price but did not 
engage in predatory pricing. Plentiful evidence—much of it unexamined by 
McGee—exists that Standard did price below cost. 
Ultimately, the trial record in Standard Oil does not lend itself to easy 
characterization. It is possible that Standard could have charged a low price 
at which it could earn a profit, but independents could not.153 In many 
 
 148. McGee, supra note 18, at 168. 
 149. The government also noted this distinction in its 1907 report. U.S. BUREAU OF CORPS., 
REPORT ON PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, supra note 40, at 487–88 (―Price discrimination does not 
necessarily mean cutting prices in competitive towns to an unprofitable level. It exists also where such 
prices, though returning a fair or even a good profit, are far less profitable than in towns where no 
restraint is put on the power of monopoly.‖). 
 150. Id. at 485 (―The evidence of the practice of price discrimination is absolutely conclusive.‖). 
See also id. at 441, 461, 508, 519. 
 151. U.S. BUREAU OF CORPS., REPORT ON TRANSPORTATION OF PETROLEUM, supra note 97, at 
18. 
 152. Thus, differences in prices ―can not possibly be explained by differences in freight rates or in 
cost of production and marketing.‖ U.S. BUREAU OF CORPS., REPORT ON PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, supra 
note 40, at 519. 
 153. See U.S. BUREAU OF CORPS., REPORT ON TRANSPORTATION OF PETROLEUM, supra note 97, 
at 302 (―The Standard Oil Company could make a large profit in the South at prices which would leave 
absolutely no profit to independents.‖). 
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markets, the railroads that transported oil gave Standard secret rebates and 
this practice makes it especially hard to calculate the price-to-cost ratio in 
such markets. The secret rebates facilitated Standard‘s ability to slash price 
to the point where competitors could not profitably remain in the market, 
but Standard could.154 Absent the railroad rebates, Standard‘s price would 
have been below its cost in some markets.155 This raises the legal issue of 
whether a monopolist who charges a price below cost has not predatorily 
priced so long as its sales are profitable due to secret rebates.156 
Even if the secret rebates were deducted from Standard‘s costs, 
however, evidence shows that Standard still charged a price below cost in 
some cases. The Bureau reported that even after factoring in its rebates, 
Standard sometimes ―put[] the prices in a given locality down even below 
its own cost of manufacture, transportation, and delivery.‖157 Thus, despite 
the railroad rebates, Standard suffered net losses in some markets. 
If Standard sometimes did price below cost, that still leaves the issue 
of how frequently it did so. McGee suggested that Standard, at most, rarely 
predatorily priced its oil158 and that this meant that predatory pricing played 
no role in Standard‘s acquisition of monopoly power. McGee, however, 
failed to recognize the strategic significance of predatory signaling. A firm 
need only engage in the practice just enough to make the threat of future 
price predation credible.159 Standard successfully used the threat of 
predatory pricing to deter entry, as the Bureau reported: 
 
 154. U.S. BUREAU OF CORPS., REPORT ON PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, supra note 40, at xli; U.S. 
BUREAU OF CORPS., REPORT ON TRANSPORTATION OF PETROLEUM supra note 97, at 303, 320. 
 155. U.S. BUREAU OF CORPS., REPORT ON PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, supra note 40, at 438 (―In 
many instances, where the Standard has cut prices in particular localities sufficiently to completely 
destroy the profits of a competitor, the Standard has undoubtedly been able to make a profit. Often the 
unfair advantage of the Standard in freight rates alone has more than equaled a fair profit.‖); U.S. 
BUREAU OF CORPS., REPORT ON TRANSPORTATION OF PETROLEUM, supra note 97, at 402. 
 156. McGee diminished the significance of the secret rebates: ―Although this subject [railroad 
rebates] lies outside the present inquiry, I am convinced that the significance of railroad rebates has also 
been misunderstood.‖ McGee, supra note 18, at 139 n.3. Beyond this cryptic footnote, McGee did not 
explain the relationship between the rebates and predatory pricing. In particular, he does not suggest 
how the rebates should affect the determination of whether Standard Oil charged a price below cost. 
  At one point, McGee asserted that railroad rebates were available to Standard‘s competitors, 
implying that the rebates had little to do with Standard‘s acquisition of monopoly power. Id. at 145 
n.22. The government‘s 1906 report suggests McGee was incorrect. U.S. BUREAU OF CORPS., REPORT 
ON TRANSPORTATION OF PETROLEUM, supra note 97, at 17. 
 157. U.S. BUREAU OF CORPS., REPORT ON PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, supra note 40, at 438. 
 158. The government‘s report, too, states that ―it is comparatively seldom the case that 
[Standard‘s prices] are so low as to leave no profit to the Standard.‖ Id.at 43. 
 159. Leslie, supra note 36, at 298 (―[T]he firm engaging in predatory pricing only has to take this 
loss of profits until it establishes sufficient credibility that its threats to engage in predatory pricing will 
deter firms from entering the market.‖). 
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Independent concerns fear to enter new markets, however tempting the 
prices. . . . They know that, after going to all this expense, there is great 
risk that the Standard will put prices down below their cost of production 
and delivery, possibly even below the Standard‘s own cost. They know 
that the Standard can afford this price-cutting and that they can not.160 
Similarly, Standard‘s reputation as a price predator played a role in its 
acquisitions. Standard‘s offers to acquire competitors were made in the 
shadow of predatory threats. The firm would only have to carry out the 
threat a few times in order to acquire a credible reputation for predation and 
this could encourage rational refinery owners to sell out to Standard. A few 
public instances of loss-inducing price predation could both deter new 
entry and facilitate less expensive acquisition of rivals. Rockefeller thought 
so;161 it is odd that McGee did not. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the trial record may not tell us with certainty whether 
Standard engaged in predatory pricing, as we define it today. But even if 
the facts of Standard Oil do not prove that the oil company engaged in 
predatory pricing, the record in that case cannot stand as proof that 
predatory pricing does not occur or that it fails when attempted. 
Examining the question in a legal framework, the evidence in the trial 
record and other sources establishes a prima facie case for predatory 
pricing by Standard. If predatory pricing skeptics wish to refute this case, 
they can attempt to do so, but they face an evidentiary burden. If they want 
to rewrite the history of the Standard Oil case, they must demonstrate that 
the numbers presented by Tarbell, the U.S. Bureau of Corporations, and 
others are wrong or misleading or support an alternative conclusion. This 
rebuttal must be done with facts, not theory.162 
Given that McGee‘s article is not truly empirical, why is it so widely 
embraced by scholars and judges as proving that predatory pricing does not 
occur and cannot succeed? The answer is most likely because McGee‘s 
conclusions fit with the economic theory that those who cite it were 
advocating. McGee argued against antitrust enforcement as part of a larger 
political, legal, and academic movement against strong antitrust law. 
 
 160. U.S. BUREAU OF CORPS., REPORT ON THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, supra note 40, at Pt. 1, 
330. See also Dalton & Esposito, supra note 25, at 187 (―The Record also suggests that Standard's 
pricing behavior discouraged new entry for a substantial period of time.‖). 
 161. See supra notes 51, 133. 
 162. See Margaret C. Levenstein, Antitrust and Business History, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 451 (2012). 
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McGee‘s analysis was consistent with the Chicago School‘s policy goals, 
which include not condemning predatory pricing due to the risk of false 
positives.163 The fear of false positives is driving courts to make predatory 
pricing claims difficult to prove.164 
McGee‘s scholarship, however, risks distorting antitrust jurisprudence 
because predatory pricing law, as shaped by McGee‘s work, creates a risk 
of false negatives. The Matsushita Court asserted that predatory pricing 
simply does not occur. Some lower courts have treated the Matsushita 
court‘s proclamation as a quasi-statement of law.165 Thus, predatory pricing 
claims fail as a matter of law because the Supreme Court has held that 
predation is neither tried nor successful. Much evidence, though, suggests 
that predatory pricing does occur.166 
The question of how antitrust law should treat predatory pricing—
particularly in light of the relative dangers of false positives and false 
negatives—is a policy debate.167 The results of an empirical case study of 
Standard might inform this policy debate. Unfortunately, it would appear 
that the direction of influence was reversed in McGee‘s study and his 
theoretical assumptions drove the study‘s conclusions. Revisiting the 
history of Standard Oil provides evidence against the economic theory that 
argues that predatory pricing is irrational and never attempted. This 
undermines the theoretical argument that antitrust law should not be 
concerned with predatory pricing. 
 
 163. See BORK, supra note 90, at 154 ; Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. 
REV. 1, 26–27 (1984). 
 164. See United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1114 (10th Cir. 2003) (―Chicago scholars 
argued that lowering prices could only be pro-competitive and any prohibition on such conduct could 
ultimately deter firms from engaging in conduct that is socially beneficial.‖); Morgan v. Ponder, 892 
F.2d 1355, 1358–59 (8th Cir. 1989) (―Indeed, there is a real danger in mislabeling such practices as 
predatory, because consumers generally benefit from the low prices resulting from aggressive price 
competition.‖). 
 165. Leslie, supra note 36, at 338–39. 
 166. Bolton, Brodley and Riordan have argued that studies claiming to not find predatory pricing 
were flawed by systematic underreporting. Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, 
Predatory Pricing: Strategy Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2245–46 (2000). 
 167. See Barak Orbach & D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust Energy, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 429, 433–35 
(2012). 
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